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In the setting of networked computation, data security can be a significant concern. Here we consider the
problem of allowing a server to remotely manipulate client supplied data, in such a way that both the information
obtained by the client about the server’s operation and the information obtained by the server about the client’s
data are significantly limited. We present a protocol for achieving such functionality in two closely related
models of restricted quantum computation – the Boson sampling and quantum walk models. Due to the limited
technological requirements of the Boson scattering model, small scale implementations of this technique are
feasible with present-day technology.
Introduction — Quantum information processing [1] allows
certain key problems, which are believed to be classically
hard, to be efficiently solved. Well known examples with real
world applications include Shor’s algorithm for integer fac-
torisation [2] and Grover’s search algorithm [3]. One of the
more promising approaches to implementing quantum algo-
rithms is linear optics quantum computation (LOQC) [4, 5],
where information is encoded into single photons and the their
wave properties are manipulated using linear optics elements.
Photons are ideally suited to communication, leading natu-
rally to models of distributed quantum computation.
A key consideration in any distributed computation scheme
is security. Consider two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice has
some data to which she would like to apply a computation,
whilst Bob has a quantum computer and an algorithm with
which he can process the data. However both sides have pro-
prietary knowledge. Alice wants to keep her data secret from
others, and Bob wants to keep his algorithm secret. This is
related to the problem of homomorphic encryption which al-
lows data to be manipulated without decrypting, so Bob can
perform a universal set of operations on Alice’s data with-
out ever learning Alice’s input state. Universal classical ho-
momorphic encryption was only first discovered in 2009 [6]
and subsequently simplified [7]. Closely related is blind com-
puting, where Alice possesses both the data and the algorithm,
and Bob owns the computer [8–10], as is the quantum private
queries protocol [11], which is used to query a database while
keeping the query secret.
In this paper we describe a technique for solving the above
problem, and hence achieving a limited quantum homomor-
phic encryption using the Boson sampling and multi-walker
quantum walk models for quantum computation.
The Boson sampling model — A first protocol for universal
LOQC was introduced by Knill, Laflamme & Milburn (KLM)
[4]. While universal for quantum computation, their protocol
is extremely demanding, requiring fast-feedforward and quan-
tum memory, which are technologically challenging and well
beyond the capabilities of present-day experiments. Since
then numerous simplifications have been proposed, most no-
tably approaches based on cluster states [12–14], which sig-
nificantly reduce physical resource requirements. However
they remain very demanding to implement.
Recently Aaronson & Arkhipov [15] introduced a much
simplified model for LOQC, known as the Boson sampling
model. While not believed to be universal, it was shown that
this protocol very likely implements an algorithm which can-
not be efficiently classically simulated (efficient classical sim-
ulation would likely imply a collapse in the polynomial hierar-
chy, PH [15]). The protocol does away with fast-feedforward
and quantum memory, requiring only a multi-photon input
state, a purely linear optics network, and photo-detection.
In the photon number basis, the input state is of the
form |ψin〉 = |11, . . . , 1p, 0p+1, . . . , 0m〉, or any permutation
thereof, where there are p photons and m modes. To the input
state a unitary map is applied, which implements the trans-
formation a†i →
∑
j Uija
†
j on the photon creation operators.
It was shown by Reck et al. [16] that any such U can be ef-
ficiently constructed using a linear network comprising only
beamsplitters and phase-shifters.
In an occupation number representation, the output state
is of the form |ψout〉 =
∑
S γS |n(S)1 , n(S)2 . . . , n(S)N 〉, where
S are the different photon number configurations, γS are the
associated amplitudes, and n(S)i is the number of photons in
mode i given configuration S. Each amplitude is proportional
to a matrix permanent, whose calculation resides in the com-
plexity class #P-complete, giving rise to the believed classical
hardness of calculating the output distribution.
The multi-walker quantum walk model — Another inter-
esting approach to LOQC is the quantum walk model [17–
19]. Here our physical system comprises a graph in which
walkers (i.e. photons) are placed at vertices and are allowed
to coherently ‘hop’ along the edges. The restriction to linear
optics means that we consider only non-interacting walkers.
The evolution is decomposed into two stages – coin (C) and
step (S) operations. The coin coherently manipulates an an-
cillary parameter known as the coin value, while the step op-
erator updates the position (i.e. vertex) of the walker accord-
ing to the direction specified by the coin. The evolution of
the system proceeds by repeated application of coin and step,
|ψout〉 = (SC)t|ψin〉. Rohde et al. [20] recently introduced a
formalism for multi-walker quantum walks on general graphs.
Indeed, numerous authors have begun experimentally demon-
strating elementary optical quantum walks [21–25].
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2It can be shown that any unitary map on the photon creation
operators can be decomposed into a non-interacting quantum
walk, and similarly any non-interacting quantum walk can be
expressed as such a unitary network [26]. As with Boson sam-
pling, no measurement or feedforward is performed within the
evolution of the quantum walk. Thus there is a natural iso-
morphism between the two formalisms. We therefore refer to
Boson sampling and multi-walker quantum walks on general
graphs interchangeably. Boson sampling can be regarded as a
classically hard task performed by a quantum walk.
Homomorphically encrypted Boson sampling and quantum
walks — The first step in our protocol is to encode the Boson
sampling input state into the polarisation basis. Suppose there
are m modes. Then for every mode in which a photon should
be present we introduce a photon in the horizontal polarisa-
tion (H), and for every mode in which no photon should be
present we introduce a photon in the vertical polarisation (V ).
Thus, there are always exactly m photons in the system and
the number of Hs in the input state is equal to the number of
photons in the corresponding non-polarisation-encoded state.
For example, if the Boson sampling computer is supposed to
be initialised with the input state |0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1〉, we would
encode this using 6 photons as |ψin〉 = |V,H,H, V, V,H〉.
Next we note that if we employ polarisation-resolving photo-
detection at the output, and only measure those photons in the
H polarisation while discarding all V photons, the operation
of the circuit is identical to the desired Boson sampling com-
puter, since H and V photons will not interfere. On the other
hand, if we employ non-polarisation-resolving detectors, the
output will effectively be corrupted.
Alice begins by preparing an encoded in-
put state |ψencoded〉 = R(kpid )⊗m|ψin〉, where
R(θ) =
(
cos θ −sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
is a polarisation rotation op-
erator, which can be implemented using wave-plates, d is the
number of divisions in the choice of rotation angle, and k
represents the kth division. Alice chooses k randomly in the
range 0 to d − 1. k can be regarded as Alice’s private key.
Thus from Bob’s perspective, the encoded state is a mixture
of input states rotated by different angles, and it is this added
noise that will allow Alice to hide her data from Bob. With d
divisions, the basis of each choice of encoded state is rotated
by pi/d from the previous. The choice of k is retained only
by Alice, while the encoded state is communicated to Bob,
who, not knowing the basis in which to measure, perceives a
mixed state. At the end of the computation Alice measures
the output state in the polarisation basis given by R(kpid ),
allowing perfect reconstruction of the desired output state
using polarisation-resolving photo-detection.
Information theoretic analysis — We now consider the se-
curity of our protocol in the context of Bob’s probability of
correctly inferring Alice’s input state. To do so we calculate
the Holevo information [1] of the state sent from Alice to Bob.
The Holevo quantity provides an upper bound on the amount
of information Bob can extract from Alice’s encoded state.
Formally, the Holevo quantity of our protocol is given by
χ(m) = −Tr(ρ log2ρ) +
1
2m
2m−1∑
i=0
Tr(ρi log2ρi),
where ρ = 12m
∑2m
i=1 ρi, and ρi =∑d−1
k=0
⊗m
j=1R
(
kpi
d
) |Pij〉〈Pij |R (−kpid ), and |Pij〉 = |H〉
when the jth bit of i is 0, otherwise |Pij〉 = |V 〉.
While a closed form for the Holevo information for arbi-
trary values of d and m is likely too much to hope for, we can
calculate the scaling of the Holevo information for d m. To
do this, we first note that since
⊗m
j=1 |Pij〉 for the various val-
ues of i form a complete basis on the space of input states, ρ
is the maximally mixed state. Therefore −Tr(ρ log2 ρ) = m.
Next we note that −Tr(ρi log2 ρi) is independent of i, and
hence it is sufficient to consider only the case of i = 0.
We consider the change of basis |0〉 = (|H〉 + i|V 〉)/√2,
|1〉 = (|H〉 − i|V 〉)/√2. As ρ0 is a mixed state of symmet-
ric states, it resides entirely in the symmetric subspace, which
has dimension n+ 1. Thus a complete basis is formed by the
states |`〉m, the symmetric state of m qubits containing ex-
actly ` qubits in state |1〉, and the rest in state |0〉. In this basis,
the density matrix ρ0 is given by
ρ0 =
1
2m
d−1∑
k=0
m∑
a,b=0
ei
(b−a)kpi
d
√(
m
a
)(
m
b
)
|a〉m〈b|m.
From this, we can see that the cross terms go to zero for large
d since in this case
∑d−1
k=0 e
i
(b−a)kpi
d → 0. In such a case the
density matrix is diagonal, and hence we have
Tr (ρi log2 ρi) =
1
2m
m∑
a=0
(
m
a
)
log2
(
1
2m
(
m
a
))
,
which is simply the entropy of the binomial distribution. This
value is known to be 12 log2
(
1
2piem
)
+ O(1/m), and hence
the Holevo quantity scales as
χ(m) = m− 1
2
log2
(
1
2
piem
)
+O
(
1
m
)
.
Hence the protocol hides 12 log2
(
1
2piem
)
+ O(1/m) bits of
information for suitably large d.
We note that if Bob has no prior information about Alice’s
chosen state, the probability that Bob correctly infers Alice’s
state can be bounded as follows. Let ρX be the density ma-
trix Bob receives from Alice when her input string is X . Bob
must make a measurement on this state to determine his guess
for X , which we denote X˜ . Without loss of generality we can
view Bob’s measurement as a POVM with 2m distinct ele-
ments {PX˜}2
m−1
X˜=0
, each corresponding to a unique choice of
X˜ . Thus the probability of Bob correctly determining whether
a given state, encoding an input state chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, corresponds to X is
P (X˜ = X) =
1
2m
Tr(PX˜ρX˜) +
1
2m
Tr ((I− PX˜) (I− ρX˜))
=
1
2m
(2m − 1− Tr(PX˜ (I− 2ρX˜))) .
3If eX˜ is the maximum eigenvalue of ρX˜ then the above prob-
ability is bounded from above by
P (X˜ = X) ≤ 1
2m
(2m − 1− (1− 2eX˜)Tr (PX˜)) .
However, as we have shown, for large d the density matrix ρX˜
tends to a binomial distribution over m + 1 states. Thus, the
maximum eigenvalue of ρX˜ is given by 2
−m( m
bm/2c
)
which
approaches
√
2/pim. Therefore, for sufficiently large m and
d, we have
P (X˜ = X) ≤ 1
2m
(
2m − 1−
(
1−
√
8
pim
)
Tr (PX˜)
)
.
Averaged over all states this gives
P =
1
2m
2m−1∑
X˜=0
P (X˜ = X) ≤
√
8
pim
.
Thus the probability of Bob guessing Alice’s input string is
bounded from above by
√
8/pim for sufficiently large m and
d.
The privacy of Bob’s secret is more straight forward to
prove. As Bob simply performs his secret operation upon Al-
ice’s input and returns it to her, the information Alice ob-
tains is exactly the same as if she makes a single query to a
black box function, and so Alice obtains the minimum pos-
sible information about Bob’s secret unitary. The probabil-
ity of Bob correctly determining Alice’s input is substantially
higher than the exponentially small bound one may hope for,
but such a strong bound would violate the no-go theorems for
oblivious transfer and bit commitment [27, 28]. An alternate
approach for Alice is to run many computations with differ-
ent input states, where only one is her desired state and the
remainder are dummies. However, this would allow Alice to
extract more information about Bob’s algorithm and is there-
fore less desirable for Bob.
The random attack — The average squared overlap between
two states encoded with random keys is,
〈|〈a|b〉|2〉 =
∑
θ
p(θ)sin2h(θ)cos2h
′
(θ),
where h is the Hamming distance between strings a and b, and
h+ h′ = m. For a large number of divisions d, the overlap is
plotted in Fig. 1.
Note that the overlap is minimised when h = m/2. Thus
it is easier to discriminate between states with Hamming dis-
tance close tom/2, and harder to distinguish states with lower
or higher Hamming distance. One way Bob can make use of
this property is to choose a key at random and measure all
photons in this basis. As the measurement basis is virtually
certain not to be unbiased with respect to the encoding basis,
the string corresponding to the output of such a measurement
will then be correlated with either the input string or its com-
plement. Thus Bob can distinguish between states with Ham-
ming distance sufficiently close to m/2.
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FIG. 1: (Colour online) log(〈|〈a|b〉|2〉) with d = 1024, against the
number of photonsm and the Hamming distance between the strings.
Nonetheless Bob cannot perfectly infer Alice’s se-
cret input state if he has no prior information on
the distribution. To see this, we note the overlap be-
tween H or V , and a rotated H or V , exhibits the
property |〈H|R(θ)|H〉|2 = |〈V |R(θ)|V 〉|2 = cos2θ. Conse-
quently, the probability of Bob’s measurement results being
perfectly correlated with Alice’s secret state, given m modes
and m photons, is |〈ψ|R(θ)⊗m|ψ〉|2 = cos2mθ, where |ψ〉 is
Alice’s input state and θ is that angle between Alice’s chosen
encoding basis and Bob’s measurement basis.
If Bob choses a polarisation basis at random, the average
probability that he will successfully infer the correct state is,
pav =
1
d
d−1∑
j=0
cos2m
(
jpi
d
)
.
Fig. 2 plots the value of this quantity for a range of values
of d and m. From it, two trends are clear. First, increasing m
decreases the probability of correctly identifying Alice’s se-
cret state. Second, increasing d also decreases this probability,
though it tends to a constant value, consistent with the bounds
obtained from the Holevo information. For a large number
of modes limm→∞ pav = 1/d, and for a large number of di-
visions limd→∞ pav = Γ(m+ 1/2)/
√
pim!, which scales as
1/
√
pim for large m. Thus this attack has a success probabil-
ity close to the theoretical limit of
√
8/pim .
Outlook & conclusion — We note that the described ap-
proach to security is very specific to the Boson sampling and
quantum walk models for LOQC, and will not work for the
KLM protocol. This is because KLM requires adaptive mea-
surement, which would require Alice disclosing the appropri-
ate measurement basis to Bob in order for him to perform the
appropriate measurement and feedforward. Thus, the security
of this protocol relies on the unique property that there is no
measurement or feedforward within the circuit.
A beneficial feature of this protocol is that only one round
of communication is needed in each direction between Alice
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FIG. 2: (Colour online) Regions for different levels of confidence
in the probability that Bob correctly infers Alice’s state using a ran-
domly chosen basis, pav < .
and Bob – Alice prepares a mixed state, sends it to Bob to
which he applies the computation and returns it back to Alice.
This guarantees that the amount of information revealed about
Bob’s operation is no more than in the ideal case.
The described approach is technologically trivial. If we
have the ability to implement Boson sampling or quantum
walks, they can be encrypted simply with the addition of ran-
domised wave-plate angles prior to and after the computation.
Thus the ability to implement encryption of these protocols is
foreseeable.
Our protocol relies on Alice performing random rotations
about the y-axis on the Bloch sphere. However it can be shown
that more general rotations about a randomly chosen axis do
not improve the asymptotic security of the scheme.
A key open question for the multi-walker quantum walk
model is its applicability. Boson sampling can be regarded as
an application of quantum walks. However, while shown to be
likely classically hard to simulate, no specific algorithmic ap-
plications have been identified. While isomorphic to the Bo-
son sampling model, the multi-walker quantum walk model
may prove more fruitful for algorithm design, since it is in-
herently graph theoretic in nature and may therefore naturally
lend itself to the development of graph theoretic algorithms.
We emphasise that our protocol does not guarantee that Bob
learns nothing about Alice’s data, but rather that the informa-
tion Bob obtains is incomplete, asymptotically reducing Bob’s
probability of successfully reconstructing the input or output
state. The trade-off that must be paid for improved security
is a large number of randomised rotation settings and a larger
interferometer.
In conclusion, we have presented a simple yet effective ap-
proach to encrypted quantum computation using two recent
models for LOQC. The requirements for this protocol are well
within current technological capabilities and could be readily
implemented with present-day technology.
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